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My subject here is one to which Irving Fisher devoted considerable
analytic and econometric effort: the effect of inflation on financial mar-
kets and capital formation.
1 Nowadays, every student learns of Fisher's
conclusion that each percentage point increase in the steady-state infla-
tion rate eventually raises the nominal interest rate by 1 percent, leaving
the real rate of interest unchanged. Moreover, since the supply of saving
depends on the real rate of interest and the demand for investable funds
also depends on the real rate of interest, a change in the rate of inflation
would have essentially no effect on the economy's real equilibrium. I say
"essentially" no effect because another great Yale economist, James
Tobin, reminded us in his 1964 Fisher Lecture that an increase in the
nominal interest rate could cause households to substitute capital for
money in their portfolios, thereby reducing the real interest rate.
The Fisher-Tobin analysis, like most theoretical analyses of macroeco-
nomic equilibrium, ignores the role of the taxes levied on capital income.
While this may have been a reasonable simplification at some time in the
past, it is quite inappropriate today. Taxes on capital income with mar-
ginal rates that are often between one-third and two-thirds can have
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profound effects on the real macroeconomic equilibrium and on the way
in which inflation affects that real equilibrium.
A simple example will illustrate the potential for substantial departures
from Irving Fisher's famous neutrality result. Consider an economy in
which saving and the demand for money are both perfectly interest
inelastic, in which there is no inflation, and in which the marginal product
of capital is 10 percent. If we ignore risk and assume that all marginal
investments are debt financed,
2 the rate of interest in the economy will
also be 10 percent. A permanent increase in the expected rate of inflation
from zero to 5 percent would raise the nominal internal rate of return on
all investments by 5 percent, which would, in turn, raise the equilibrium
rate of interest in the economy from 10 percent to 15 percent. All of this is
just as Irving Fisher would have it.
But now consider the introduction of a corporate tax of 100T percent on
the profits of the business with a deduction allowed for the interest
payments. It is easily shown that, if economic depreciation is allowed, the
interest rate that firms can afford to pay remains 10 percent in the absence
of inflation. But inflation now raises the interest rate not by any increase
in the inflation rate but by that increase in inflation divided by (1 — T).
3 If
T is 50 percent, the 5 percent increase in expected inflation raises the
interest rate by 10 percent to 20 percent. This is easily understood since
the 10 percent increase only costs a firm a net-of-tax 5 percent, just the
amount by which inflation has raised the nominal return on capital.
In this example, the effect of a 5 percent inflation rate is to raise the real
rate of interest received by savers from 10 percent to 15 percent. Their
real net-of-tax rate of interest will, however, depend on the extent to
which the interest income is subject to personal tax. If every lender's tax
rate is exactly equal to the corporate rate, the real net rate of interest will
be unaffected by the rate of inflation.
4 But more generally, individual tax
rates differ substantially
5 and the real net-of-tax return rises for those
individuals with tax rates below the corporate rate and falls for the others.
If saving is sensitive to the real net return, these changes will alter the
capital intensity of the economy which in turn will change the marginal
product of capital. The effect on the final equilibrium of a change in the
2. Intramarginal investments may be financed by the equity resulting from the extre-
preneurs' original investment and from subsequent retained earnings. See Stiglitz (1973) for
such a model.
3. Feldstein (1976; chap. 3 above) examines this simple case as well as the more general
situation in which both saving and money demand are sensitive to the rate of return. If/' is
the marginal product of capital and TT is the rate of inflation, the nominal interest rate
satisfies i = f + TT/(1 - T).
4. If lenders are taxed at 100 8 percent, the net-of-tax nominal interest rate rises by (1 -
9)/(l - T) times the increase in the rate of inflation. With 8 = T, this is one and the real net
interest rate therefore remains unchanged.
5. Individual tax rates include not only the statutory personal tax rates but the tax rates
on savings channelled through pension funds, insurance, and other financial intermediaries.245 Inflation, Tax Rules, and Investment
expected rate of inflation will depend on the capital-labor substitutability,
on the distribution of individual and business tax rates, and on the
interest sensitivity of saving and money demand (as well as on the
correlation between these sensitivities and the personal tax rates). In
general terms, inflation will raise capital intensity in this model if the rate
at which savers are taxed is less than the tax rate on borrowers.
Introducing a more realistic description of depreciation radically alters
this conclusion. In calculating taxable profits, firms are generally allowed
to deduct the cost of capital investments only over several years. Because
these deductions are usually based on the original or "historic" cost of the
assets, the real value of these depreciation deductions can be substan-
tially reduced during a period of inflation. This raises the real tax rate on
investment income and therefore lowers the real interest rate that firms
can afford to offer. The change in the nominal interest rate may be
greater or less than the change in inflation and depends on the balance
between the positive effect of interest rate deductibility and the adverse
effect of original cost depreciation. This conclusion can be extended
directly to an economy with equity as well as debt finance (Feldstein,
Green, and Sheshinski, 1978; chap. 4 above) and to an economy with
government debt (Feldstein, 1980; chap. 5 above).
In short, the impact of inflation and of monetary policy depends
critically on the fiscal setting. It is therefore unfortunate, but all too
common, that theoretical analyses of inflation and of monetary policy
ignore the tax structure and assume that all taxes are lump sum levies.
Because capital tax rules differ substantially among countries, inflation
can have very different effects in different countries on the rate and
composition of capital accumulation. In the past several years, I have
tried to explore the theoretical relationship between inflation and tax
rules and to measure the impact of inflation in the United States on
effective tax rates (Feldstein and Summers, 1979; chap. 8 above) and on
the yields on real capital, on debt, and on equity.
6 Those studies, together
with the results presented in the current paper, have led me to conclude
that the interaction of inflation and the existing tax rules has contributed
substantially to the decline of business investment in the United States.
The rate of business's fixed investment in the United States has fallen
quite sharply since the mid-1960s. The share of national income devoted
to net nonresidential fixed investment fell by more than one-third be-
tween the last half of the 1960s and the decade of the 1970s: the ratio of
net fixed nonresidential investment to GNP averaged 0.040 from 1965
6. See Feldstein and Poterba (1980ft) with respect to yields on real capital; Feldstein and
Summers (1978; chap. 9 above), Feldstein and Eckstein (1970), and Feldstein and Cham-
berlain (1973) with respect to yields on debt; and Feldstein (1980b, d; chaps. 10 and 11
above) with respect to equity yields.246 The Effect on Investment
through 1969 but only 0.025 from 1970 through 1979.
7 The corresponding
rate of growth of the nonresidential capital stock declined by an even
greater percentage: between 1965 and 1969, the annual rate of growth of
the fixed nonresidential capital stock averaged 5.5 percent; in the 1970s,
this average dropped to 3.2 percent.
8
The present paper shows how U.S. tax rules and a high rate of inflation
interact to discourage investment. The nature of this interaction is com-
plex and operates through several different channels. For example, while
nominal interest rates have been unusually high in recent years, the
deductibility of nominal interest costs in the calculation of taxable profits
implies that the real net-of-tax interest rates that firms pay have actually
become negative! In itself, this would, of course, encourage, an increased
rate of investment. But, since existing tax rules limit the depreciation
deduction to amounts based on the original cost of the assets, a higher
rate of inflation reduces the maximum real rate of return that firms can
afford to pay. The effect of inflation on the incentive to invest depends on
balancing the change in the cost of funds (including equity as well as debt)
against the change in the maximum potential return that firms can afford
to pay. This explanation of investment behavior, which is close to Irving
Fisher's own approach, is developed more precisely in section 14.4 and
then related to the observed variation of investment since 1955.
The interaction of tax rules and inflation can also be seen in a simpler
and more direct way. The combined effects of original cost depreciation,
the taxation of nominal capital gains, and other tax rules raises the
effective tax rate paid on the capital income of the corporate sector by the
corporations, their owners, and their creditors. This reduces the real net
rate of return that the ultimate suppliers of capital can obtain on nonres-
idential fixed investment. This in turn reduces the incentive to save and
distorts the flow of saving away from fixed nonresidential investment.
Even without specifying the mechanism by which the financial markets
and managerial decisions achieve this reallocation, the variations in
investment during the past three decades can be related to changes in this
real net rate of return. This approach is pursued in section 14.3.
In addition to these two approaches, I have also examined the implica-
tions of inflation in a capital stock adjustment model of the type de-
veloped by Jorgenson and his collaborators.
9 Those results are presented
in section 14.5.
7. Data on net fixed nonresidential investment is presented in table 5.3 of the National
Income and Product Accounts. The full time series is presented in table 14.1 below. All data
and estimates in this paper are from the National Income and Product Accounts before the
December 1980 revision.
8. See table 14.1 below for the annual values. Data on the net stock of fixed nonresiden-
tial capital is presented in the Survey of Current Business, April 1976 and subsequent issues.
9. See Jorgenson (1963), Hall and Jorgenson (1967), Gordon and Jorgenson (1976), and
Hall (1977) among others.247 Inflation, Tax Rules, and Investment
14.1 On Estimating False Models
My focus in this paper is on assessing the extent to which investment
responds to changes in the incentives that are conditioned by tax rules.
Separate calculations based on previous research are then used to evalu-
ate the effect on investment of the interaction between inflation and the
tax rules.
Despite the extensive amount of research that has been done on
investment behavior, there are still many economists who question
whether investment does respond significantly to what might generally be
called "price incentives" and not just to business cycle conditions.
1
0 One
important reason for these doubts is the failure of previous studies to
reflect correctly the impact of inflation. When the price incentive variable
is significantly mismeasured, it is not surprising that its impact on invest-
ment is understated. A further reason, and, I believe, a more fun-
damental one, is that the investment process is far too complex for any
single econometric model to be convincing. Moreover, making a statisti-
cal model more complicated in an attempt to represent some particular
key features of "reality" or of rational optimization often requires impos-
ing other explicit and implausible assumptions as maintained hypotheses.
The problem posed for the applied econometrician by the complexity
of reality and the incompleteness of available theory is certainly not
limited to studies of investment. In my experience, there are relatively
few problems in which the standard textbook procedure of specifying
"the correct model" and then estimating the unknown parameters can
produce convincing estimates. Much more common is the situation in
which the specifications suggested by a rich economic theory overexhaust
the information in the data. In time series analysis, this exhaustion occurs
rapidly because of the limited degrees of freedom. But even with very
large cross-section samples, collinearity problems reduce the effective
degrees of freedom and make it impossible to consider all of the variables
or functional forms that a rich theory would suggest. These problems are
exacerbated by the inadequate character of the data themselves. Even
when information is available and measurement errors are small, the
accounting measures used by business firms and national income
accounts rarely correspond to the concepts of economic theory.
The result of all this is that in practice all econometric specifications are
necessarily "false" models. They are false models not only in the in-
nocuous sense that the residuals reflect omitted variables but also in the
more serious sense that the omissions and other misspecifications make it
impossible to obtain unbiased or consistent estimates of the parameters
10. See, e.g., the article by Clark (1979) and the book by Eisner (1979) for recent
examples of studies that conclude that price incentive effects are economically insignificant
or, at most, are quite small.248 The Effect on Investment
even by sophisticated transformations of the data. The applied econo-
metrician, like the theorist, soon discovers from experience that a useful
model is not one that is "true" or "realistic" but one that is parsimonious,
plausible, and informative.
Unfortunately, econometric research is not often described in such
humble terms. The resulting clash between the conventional textbook
interpretation of econometric estimates and the obvious limitations of
false models has led to an increasing skepticism in the profession about
the usefulness of econometric evidence. While some of this skepticism
may be a justifiable antidote to naive optimism and exaggerated claims, I
believe it is based on a misunderstanding of the potential contribution of
empirical research in economics.
I am convinced that econometric analysis helps us to learn about the
economy and that better econometric methods help us to make more
reliable inferences from the evidence. But I would reject the traditional
view of statistical inference that regards the estimation of an econometric
equation as analogous to the "critical experiment" of the natural sciences
that can, with a single experiment, provide a definitive answer to a central
scientific question. I would similarly reject an oversimplified Bayesian
view of inference that presumes that the economist can specify an explicit
prior distribution over the set of all possible true models or that the
likelihood function is so informative that it permits transforming a very
diffuse prior over all possible models into a very concentrated posterior
distribution.
Although I am very sympathetic to the general Bayesian logic, I think
that such well specified priors and such informative likelihood functions
are incompatible with the "false models" and inadequate data with which
we are forced to work. I think that the learning process is more complex.
Perhaps the phrase "expert inference" best captures what I have in mind.
The expert sees not one study but many. He examines not only the
regression coefficients but also the data themselves. He understands the
limits of the data and the nature of the institutions. He forms his judg-
ments about the importance of omitted variables and about the plausibil-
ity of restrictions on the basis of all this knowledge and of his understand-
ing of the theory of economics and statistics. In a general way, he behaves
like the Bayesian who combines prior information and sample evidence
to form a posterior distribution, but, because of the limitations and
diversity of the data and the models that have been estimated, he cannot
follow the formal rules of Bayesian inference.
1
1
As a practical matter, we often need different studies to learn about
different aspects of any problem. The idea of estimating a single complete
11. Learner (1978) presents very insightful comments about the problems of inference
and specification search as well as some specific techniques that can be rigorously justified in
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model that tells about all the parameters of interest and tests all implicit
restrictions is generally not feasible with the available data. Instead,
judgments must be formed by studying the results of several studies, each
of which focuses on part of the problem and makes false assumptions
about other parts.
The basic reference on this type of "expert inference" isn't Jeffreys,
Zellner, or Learner. It is the children's fable about the five blind men who
examined an elephant. The important lesson in that story is not the fact
that each blind man came away with a partial and "incorrect" piece of
evidence. The lesson is rather that an intelligent maharajah who studied
the findings of these five men could probably piece together a good
judgmental picture of an elephant, especially if he had previously seen
some other four-footed animal.
The danger, of course, in this procedure is that any study based on a
false model may yield biased estimates of the effects of interest. Although
informed judgement may help the researcher to distinguish innocuous
maintained hypotheses from harmful ones, some doubt will always re-
main. In general, howerer, the biases in different studies will not be the
same. If the biases are substantial, different studies will point to signifi-
cantly different conclusions. In contrast, a finding that the results of
several quite different studies all point to the same conclusion sug-
gests that the specification errors in each of the studies are relatively
innocuous.
When the data cannot be used to distinguish among alternative plausi-
ble models, the overall economic process is underidentified. This may
matter for some purposes but not for others. Even if the process as a
whole is underidentified, the implications with respect to some particular
variable (i.e., the conditional predictions of the effect of changing some
variable) may be the same for all models and therefore unaffected by the
underidentification. This "partial identification" is achieved, because the
data contain a clear message that is not sensitive to model specification.
Of course, not all issues can be resolved in this satisfying way. For
many problems, different plausible specifications lead to quite different
conclusions. When this happens, the aspect that is of interest (i.e., the
predicted effect of changing a particular variable) is effectively under-
identified. No matter how precisely the coefficients of any particular
specification may appear to be estimated, the relevant likelihood function
is very flat. In these cases, estimating alternative models to study the
same question can be a useful reminder of the limits of our knowledge.
1
2
12. For a simplified formal analogy, consider the problem of estimating the elasticity of
demand for some product with respect to permanent income. Since permanent income is
not observed, some proxy must be used. Each potential proxy is, however, likely to
introduce a bias of its own. If the estimated elasticity is similar for several quite different
proxies, there is a reasonable presumption that each bias is relatively small.250 The Effect on Investment
14.2 Using Alternative Models of Investment Behavior
The potential advantage of using several alterative parsimonious mod-
els is well illustrated by the analysis of investment behavior. There is a
wide variety of empirical issues that are of substantial importance both
for understanding the economy and for assessing the importance of
different government policies. How sensitive is investment to tax incen-
tives? To interest rates? To share prices? To the expectation of future
changes in tax rules or market conditions? And what is the time pattern of
the response to these stimuli? While an estimate of "the correct model"
of investment behavior could in principle answer all of these questions at
once, it is in practice necessary to pursue different questions with differ-
ent studies. The purpose of the present study, as I indicated in the
introduction, is to assess the extent to which changes in tax incentives and
disincentives—and particularly those changes that are due to inflation—
alter the flow of investment. Focusing on this issue means that some
assumptions must explicity or implicitly be made about the other issues
and that the estimated effect of the tax changes is conditional on those
assumptions. I find it quite reassuring therefore that estimates based on
three quite different kinds of models all point to the same conclusion
about the likely magnitude of the response to inflation and to effective tax
rates.
The current state of investment theory also indicates the need to
examine alternative models. While there is probably considerable agree-
ment about the essential features of a very simple theoretical model of
investment behavior, there is much less consensus about the appropriate
framework for applied studies of investment behavior. The disagree-





The traditional capital stock adjustment models assume that capital is
homogeneous and that the purpose of investment is to increase the size of
this homogeneous stock until, roughly speaking, the return on the last
unit of capital is reduced to the cost of funds. An alternative and more
realistic view sees capital as quite heterogeneous. There are two aspects
of such heterogeneity. First, capital consists of a large number of differ-
ent kinds of equipment and structures. At any point in time there may be
too much of one kind of capital and too little of another. A simple
aggregate relationship loses this potentially important information. A
much more fundamental kind of heterogeneity is associated with the flow
of new investment opportunities. Each year, new investment possibilities
13. No attempt is made here to survey the existing empirical research on investment or
to examine all of the arguments about specification. For recent surveys, see Nickell (1978)
and Rowley and Trivedi (1975).251 Inflation, Tax Rules, and Investment
are created by innovations in technology, taste, and market conditions.
This exogenous flow of new investment opportunities with high rates of
return can induce investment even when the total stock of capital is too
large in the sense that the marginal product of an equiproportional
increase in all types of capital is less than the cost of funds or the value of
Tobin's g-ratio is less than one.
1
4
Even within the framework of homogeneous capital models, there has
been much debate about the choice between putty-putty models in which
all investment decisions are reversible and the putty-clay models in which
invested capital has a permanently fixed capital-labor ratio.
1
5 While the
truth no doubt lies somewhere between these extremes (old equipment
and processes can be modified but not costlessly "melted down" and
reformed), the more complex putty-clay model is undoubtedly a more
realistic microeconomic description than the putty-putty model.
Closely related is the issue of replacement investment, a quite signifi-
cant issue since roughly one-half of gross investment is absorbed in
replacement. The simplest model of replacement is that a constant frac-
tion of the homogeneous capital stock wears out each period. A more
realistic description would recognize that output decay is not exponential
but varies with the age of the equipment. More generally, the timing of
replacement and the level of maintenance expenditure are economic
decisions that will respond to actual and anticipated changes in the cost of




The conventional Keynesian picture of investment that motivates the
accelerator model of investment and most other capital stock adjustment
models assumes that each firm's sales are exogenous. The firm is assumed
to take the price of its product and the level of its sales as given, and then
to select the capacity to produce this level of output. A more general
specification would recognize that the firm sets its own level of output,
taking as given either the market price of its product or the demand
function for its product.
There are analogous issues about the nature of the markets in which
the firms buy inputs. The simplest assumption is that these markets are
perfect and that the market prices do not depend on the quantities
purchased. A more realistic description would recognize that the short-
run supply function of labor to the individual firm is likely to be less than
infinitely elastic and that, for the economy as a whole, the short-run
14. This is quite separate from the reason for investing when q is less than one that is
implied by the analysis of Auerbach (1979a), Bradford (1979), and King (1977).
15. See Nickell (1978) for an extensive discussion of putty-clay specifications.
16. See Feldstein and Rothschild (1974) for a critique of the constant proportional
replacement hypothesis and an analysis of the potential effects on replacement investment
of changes in tax rates and interest rates.252 The Effect on Investment




Closely related is the sensitivity of adjustment costs to the volume of
investment. The simplest assumption is that there are no adjustment costs
and that the total cost of any total investment is independent of the speed
at which it is done. In contrast, the managerial and planning costs may be
a significant part of the cost of capital acquisition and may rise exponen-
tially with the rates of net and gross investment. Abel (1978) has shown
how a capital stock adjustment model can be extended to include adjust-
ment costs and how doing so can explain why the firm increases its rate of
investment only slowly even when the marginal return on installed capital
substantially exceeds its cost.
14.2.3 Financial Behavior
There remains much controversy about the role of internal and exter-
nal finance and about the related issue of the factors determining the cost
of funds to the firm. The simplest model assumes that the costs of debt
and equity funds are independent of both the debt-equity ratio and the
volume of the firm's external finance. More general analyses reject the
extreme Modigliani-Miller result and recognize that, beyond a certain
point, increases in the debt-equity ratio raise the cost of funds. Similarly,
it is frequently argued that the availablility of retained earnings lowers
the cost of funds (at least in the eyes of management) and therefore
affects the timing even if not the equilibrium level of investment.
1
8
Tax rules significantly affect the costs to the firm of debt and equity
finance. The implications of this obvious statement have been the subject
of much research and debate in the past few years.
1
9 At one extreme is the
conclusion of Stiglitz (1973) that U.S. firms should finance marginal
investments exclusively by debt, retaining earnings to avoid the dividend
tax and using the retained earnings to finance intramarginal investments.
Auerbach (1979a), Bradford (1979), and King (1977) have argued that
retaining earnings does not avoid the dividend tax but only postpones it
without lowering its present value; this implies that retained earnings are
substantially less costly than new equity funds and that the capital stock
should be expanded even if the market valuation of additional capital is
less than one-for-one.
2
0 These types of conclusions reflect a world of
17. Keynes (1936) emphasized that rising cost of inputs is a principal reason for the
declining marginal efficiency of investment in the short run. See Brechling (1975) on the
empirical importance of this.
18. See, e.g., Coen (1968) and Feldstein and Flemming (1971) for evidence on this
point.
19. See, among others, Auerbach (1979a), Bradford (1979), Feldstein, Green, and
Sheshinski (1979), King (1977), Miller (1977), and Stiglitz (1973).
20. For an application of this to the empirical study of investment behavior, see Sum-
mers (1980a).253 Inflation, Tax Rules, and Investment
certainty and one in which all individual investors have the same personal
income tax rates. Although complete models with uncertainty and di-
verse individual tax rates have not yet been fully worked out, it is clear
from partial studies (e.g., Feldstein and Green, 1979, and Feldstein and
Slemrod, 1980) that these extensions can significantly alter conventional
results.
14.2.4 Expectations and the Decision Process
With a putty-putty technology and reversible investment, expectations
are irrelevant. But when an investment commits the firm to a future
capital stock with a fixed capital-labor ratio, expectations about the
future are crucial. Although simple moving averages of past variables are
the most common representation of the process by which expectations
are formed, this simplification may cause serious misspecification errors
in some contexts. Helliwell and Glorieux (1970) and Abel (1978) have
developed forward-looking models of expectations. Lucas (1976) has
emphasized the potential instability of all such fixed-coefficient average
representations while Sargent (1978) and Summers (1980d) have shown
both the possibility and the difficulty of developing even quite simple
models of factor demand that are consistent with rational expectations.
Even when investment models acknowledge that expectations are
uncertain, the assumption of risk neutrality is usually invoked to simplify
the analysis. In fact, investment behavior may be substantially influenced
by risk aversion, changes in risk perception, and the pursuit of strategies
that reduce the risk of major capital commitments.
In each of the cases that I have been describing, the researcher must
choose (implicitly or explicitly) between a more tractable but usually less
realistic assumption and an assumption that is more realistic but also
more difficult to apply satistically. In general, the choice has gone in favor
of the more tractable but less realistic specification. Moreover, imple-
menting any one of the more complex assumptions often makes it too
difficult to implement some other more realistic assumption, thus inevit-
ably forcing the researcher to choose among false models.
The work of Jorgenson and his collaborators
2
1 well illustrates this
problem of choice. In each case, Jorgenson and his colleagues have
selected the more tractable but less realistic assumption. Because they
impose the further restriction that the technology of each firm is Cobb-
Douglas, the data are required only to determine the time pattern of the
response of investment to prior changes in the desired capital stock.
2
2
21. See the references cited in note 9 above.
22. The Jorgenson procedure also estimates a further parameter that should equal the
capital coefficient in the Cobb-Douglas production function, i.e., the share of capital
income in total output. Estimates of this parameter are also invariably far too low; although
this indicates that the model is "false," it does not necessarily imply that the estimated
effects of tax rules and inflation are misleading.254 The Effect on Investment
There is no separate estimation of the effect of tax rules and no specific
tests of the implied effect on investment of changes in tax rules and
inflation. In section 14.5,1 adopt the general Jorgenson specification but
relax the constraint that the technology is Cobb-Douglas and also the
constraint that the response of firms to the tax-induced changes in the
user cost of capital is the same as their response to other sources of
variation in the user cost of capital. The results indicate that a correct
measurement of the impact of inflation in the context of this model
substantially increases its explanatory power and that with the correctly
measured variables the data are consistent with an elasticity of substitu-
tion of one and with the assumption that firms respond in the same way to
all changes in the user cost of capital.
Of course, the support for this conclusion is conditioned on all of the
other false maintained assumptions. I have, however, also examined two
other quite different models that do not impose these constraints. The
analysis of section 14.3, which relates investment to the real net-of-tax
rate of return received by the suppliers of capital, avoids any reference to
financial market variables. While it is therefore obviously completely
uninformative about many potentially interesting issues, it avoids con-
ditioning the estimated responsiveness of investment on any theory of
corporate finance. The specification in terms of the flow of investment
avoids the assumption of homogenous capital or a putty-putty technol-
ogy. Again, this makes the model uninformative about important issues
but avoids constraining the results by some obviously strong assumptions
of a false model. There are, of course, potential biases in this approach
since it fails to distinguish different reasons for changes in investment and
omits variables that may be significant (e.g., changes in government debt,
international capital flow, or other factors that would in principle be
reflected in financial variables).
The third approach, presented in section 14.4, avoids some of these
problems but, of course, at the cost of introducing new ones. This
specification relates the flow of investment to the difference between the
cost of funds to the firm and the maximum potential rate of return that the
firm can afford to pay on a standard investment project. The financial cost
of funds is thus explicitly included. This, however, requires specifying the
"true" cost of debt and equity funds and their relative importance. The
specification does, however, avoid restrictive assumptions about technol-
ogy and other aspects of investment behavior. But, like the other two
specifications, this return-over-cost specification is a false model whose
coefficients might well be biased.
The strength of the empirical evidence therefore rests on the fact that
all three quite different specifications support the same conclusion that
the heavier tax burden associated with inflation has substantially de-
pressed nonresidential investment in the United States. The magnitude255 Inflation, Tax Rules, and Investment
of the effect implied by each of these three models indicates that the
adverse changes in the tax variables since 1965 have depressed invest-
ment by more than 1 percent of GNP, a reduction which exceeds 40
percent of the rate of investment in recent years.
14.3 Investment and the Real Net Rate of Return
Individuals divide their income between saving and consuming and, to
the extent that they save, those resources are distributed among housing,
inventories, plant and equipment, and investments abroad. Individuals
make these decisions not only directly, but also through financial inter-
mediaries, and through the corporations of which they are direct and
indirect shareholders.
The most fundamental determinant of the extent to which individuals
channel resources into nonresidential fixed investment should be the real
net-of-tax rate of return on that investment, a variable that I will denote
RN.
2
3 Although the idea of the real net-of-tax return is conceptually
simple, its calculation involves a number of practical as well as theoretical
difficulties. Because of data limitations, the calculation is restricted to
nonfinancial corporations even though total nonresidential fixed invest-
ment refers to a somewhat broader set of firms. The real net return is
denned as the product of the real pretax return on capital (R) and one
minus the effective tax rate (1-ETR) on that return.
The pretax return is estimated as the ratio of profits plus interest
expenses to the value of the capital stock. Profits are based on economic
depreciation and a currect measure of inventory costs; capital gains and
losses on the corporate debt are irrelevant since the calcuation deals with
the combined return to debt and equity. The value of the capital stock
includes the replacement cost value of fixed capital and inventories and




The effective tax rate on this capital income includes the taxes paid by
the corporations, their shareholders, and their creditors to the federal
government and to the state and local governments. The shareholders
and creditors consist not only of individuals but also of various financial
intermediaries including banks, pension funds, and insurance companies.
23. The rate of return on other types of investments might also matter. Since the
interaction of inflation and tax rules raised the potential return on owner-occupied housing
(Feldstein, 1980a; Poterba, 1980), the effect ofRNmay be overestimated but this overstate-
ment only reflects another way in which inflational and tax rules interact to reduce nonre-
sidential fixed investment.
24. Feldstein and Summers (1977) discuss the conceptual problems in measuring the
capital income and rate of return. Feldstein and Poterba (1980a) use the new capital stock
data provided by the Commerce Department and Federal Reserve Bank to calculate the
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In an earlier study, Lawrence Summers and I did a detailed analysis of the
distribution of corporate equity and debt among the different classes of
shareholders and creditors and of the relevant marginal federal tax rates
for each such investor (Feldstein and Summers, 1979; chap. 8 above).
More recently, James Poterba and I refined this analysis and extended it
to include the taxes paid to state and local governments. The effective
rate of tax is shown in column 4 of table 14.1. The resulting net-of-tax rate
of return is shown in the fifth column.
The pretax rate of return varies cyclically as well as from year to year
but has experienced no overall trend.
2
5 The average return from 1953
through 1979 was 11.0 percent. The effective tax rate was quite high in the
1950s and then declined sharply in the 1960s; at the individual level this
reflected a significant reduction in personal tax rates while at the corpo-
rate level this reflected changes in depreciation rules and the statutory
corporate tax rate. Since the mid-1960s, the effective tax rate has moved
sharply and somewhat erratically upward, primarily reflecting the over-
statement of capital income that occurs when inflation distorts the
measurement of depreciation, inventory profits, interest payments, and
capital gains.
2
6 The growth of state and local taxes and various changes in
personal tax rates contributed somewhat to this overall increase. The real
net rate of return shows a general pattern that reflects the changing
effective tax rate as well as the cyclical and year-to-year fluctuations in the
pretax rate of return. This key rate of return varied around 3.3 percent in
the 1950s, rose by the mid-1960s to 6.5 percent, averaged 5.0 percent for
the 1960s as a whole, and then dropped in the 1970s to an average of only
2.8 percent.
Since the net rate of return varies cyclically, its estimated impact on
investment can reflect cyclical as well as more fundamental influences. To
separate these effects, the equations in this section relate the investment
rate to a lagged cyclical measure of aggregate demand as well as to the
real net return. It is also useful to consider two more explicit ways of
focusing on the more fundamental changes in the real rate of return. A
cyclically adjusted measure of the real net return was calculated as
follows. First, the real pretax rate of return (R) is adjusted by regressing it
on the difference between GNP and capacity GNP and then calculating
the rate of return for each year at a standard GNP gap of 1.7 percent; this
variable, denoted RA (for adjusted) and shown in column 6 of table 14.1,
eliminates cyclical but not year-to-year variations in the pretax return.
Since there is no trend in the pretax return, eliminating random as well as
cyclical variations in the pretax return would leave only a constant.
25. Feldstein and Summers (1977) showed that the apparent downward trend in the first
half of the 1970s was not statistically significant. For more recent supporting evidence, see
Feldstein and Poterba (1980ft).
26. This impact of inflation is discussed in Feldstein, Green, and Sheshinski (1978; chap.
4 above) and calculated in detail in Feldstein and Summers (1979; chap. 8 above).259 Inflation, Tax Rules, and Investment
The cyclical and random fluctuations in the effective tax rate were
eliminated in a more fundamental way by using the explicit statutory
provisions. Using a method developed in an earlier study (Feldstein and
Summers, 1978; chap. 9 above) and described in section 14.4,1 calculated
the real net rate of return that a firm could afford to pay on the debt and
equity used to finance a new investment that, in the absence of all taxes,
would have a real yield of 12 percent. This net rate of return varies from
year to year because of changes in the tax rules and in the anticipated rate
of inflation. The ratio of the net rate of return on a mix of debt and equity
to the assumed 12 percent real pretax return measures the changes in the
effective tax rate that are not due to fluctuations in the pretax rate of
return, the rate of current investment, or other year-to-year fluctuations.
More formally, this ratio equals 1-ETRA and the ETRA value is shown
in column 7 of table 14.1.
2
7
Combining the adjusted pretax return and the adjusted effective tax
rate gives the adjusted net return (RNA — RA (1-ERTA)) shown in
column 8 of table 14.1.
Although this variable is purged of cyclical variation, it still reflects
year-to-year variation in the.pretax return. Eliminating all such variation
and treating the pretax return as a constant implies that all of the varia-
tion in the net return comes from the effective tax rate variable. This
possibility is tested below in the context of a more general specification in
which both RNA and 1-ETRA are included separately.
The basic specification relates the ratio of real net investment to real
GNP (FIY) to the real net rate of return (RN) and the Federal Reserve
Board's measure of capacity utilization (UCAP).
2* I use annual data and
lag both regressors one year:
2
9
(1) ^ flo + «i tfty-1 + 02 UCAPt_! + ut
It
where ut is a random disturbance about which more will be said below.
Although quarterly data could have been constructed, much of the
basic information that is used to calculate the net return variable is
available only annually; the within-year variations in a quarterly series
27. This measure of the effective tax rate differs conceptually from the unadjusted
measure in a number of ways. It is an ex ante concept for new investment rather than an ex
post measure on existing capital. No account is taken of the important effect of inflation on
the taxation of artificial inventory profits or of the changing rates of state and local taxes.
The tax rates on shareholders and creditors are also measured much more crudely.
28. This specification in terms of investment flows represents a disequilibrium process
rather than an equal stock adjustment. The special problems of capital heterogeneity and
putty-clay technology may make this direct disequilibrium specification more appropriate,
especially for explaining and predicting changes in investment over a period of ten to twenty
years.
29. Note that since the equation refers to net investment, the past capital stock is not
included. I return to this issue below.260 The Effect on Investment




A lag in response has been found in all previous investment studies and
reflects the delays in decision making and in the production and delivery
of plant and equipment. The lag also avoids the obvious problem of
simultaneity between concurrent investment and capacity utilization or
other measures of business cycle activity. More general lag structures and
other possible explanatory variables have been considered; those results
are also described below.
All of the specifications are estimated by least squares with a first-order
autocorrelation correction. The autocorrelation correction algorithm
estimates the first-order autocorrelation parameter simultaneously with
the other coefficients using a procedure that is equivalent to maximum
likelihood if the disturbances are normally distributed. The correction
adds to the efficiency of the estimates and, more importantly, avoids the
potentially serious downward bias in the estimated standard errors about
which Granger and Newbold (1974) have so persuasively warned. For
many of the basic specifications I have also checked the constraint im-
plied by the first-order transformation and found that it cannot be re-
jected; I have also estimated the specification in first difference form and
found similar coefficients. The evidence on this is presented below. (I
might also add that simple OLS estimates without autocorrelation correc-
tion also produce essentially the same results.)
The basic result is shown in equation (2):









with standard errors shown in parentheses and the coefficient of ut_x
indicating the first-order autocorrelation parameter. Before looking at
other specifications, it is useful to consider briefly the magnitude of the
estimated coefficients. Since the net return variable had a standard
deviation of 0.013 for the sample period, a move of RNfrom one standard
30. Extending the analysis to quarterly observations might nevertheless provide more
information about the time pattern of response and about the effect of changes in capacity
utilization. Of course, the combination of measurement problems and the inherent autocor-
relation of the data imply that using quarterly observation would not increase the effective
degrees of information by anything like a factor of four.261 Inflation, Tax Rules, and Investment
deviation below the mean to one standard deviation above would in-
crease the investment ratio by about 0.012, approximately 1.5 times its
standard deviation and 45 percent of its 25-year average value. Since the
capacity utilization variable has a standard deviation of 0.044, a two-
standard deviation increase in this variable would raise the investment
ratio by about 0.0025 or only one-fifth of the change induced by a similar
change in RN.
M
Reestimating equation (2) in first-difference form (for 1955 through
1978) shows that the estimated coefficient of RN is quite robust: its
coefficient is 0.471 with a standard error of 0.113. The capacity utilization
coefficient falls to 0.008 with a standard error of 0.021 and the Durbin-
Watson statistic indicates negative serial correlation. To test the con-
straints imposed by the first-order autocorrelation adjustment, I esti-
mated the ordinary least squares regression of the investment ratio on its
own lagged value and on one- and two-period lags in RN and UCAP. The
reduction in the revised sum of squares was only 6 percent and the
corresponding F-statistic of 0.54 was far less than the 5 percent critical
value of 3.55.
Using the cyclically adjusted measure of the net return (RNA) gives
greater weight to the cyclical capacity utilization variable and slightly
lowers the estimated effect of changes in the fundamental determinants
of the net return:
3
2









Several different more general distributed lag specifications were also
estimated. There is some weak evidence that the mean lag between RN
and the investment ratio is longer than a year and that the cumulative
effect of RN on the investment ratio is larger than equation (2) implies.
For example, when the variable RNt_2 is added to the earlier specifica-
tion, its coefficient is 0.20 with a standard error of 0.14; the sum of the
coefficients on RNt_x and RN,_1 becomes 0.60. Second-order polynomial
distributed lags with a four- or five-year span and a final value constrained
31. Since the standard error of the capacity utilization coefficient is relatively large, the
coefficient of 0.028 should be regarded as subject to considerable error.
32. The sample is two years shorter because the information required to calculate ETRA
is not available before 1954 or after 1976.262 The Effect on Investment
to be zero imply that the coefficients of RNt_ 1 and RNt_2 are significantly different from zero but that further coefficients are not; the sum of the
coefficients varies between 0.45 and 0.55, depending on the exact spe-
cification. Further lags on the capacity utilization variables are never both
positive and significantly different from zero.
Redefining the investment variable as the ratio of net investment to
capacity GNP has essentially no effect; the coefficient of RN rises to 0.50
(standard error 0.10) and the capacity utilization coefficient remains
essentially unchanged at 0.026 (s.e. = 0.026).
All of the equations are estimated using the net rate of investment
because I believe that the Commerce Department's very disaggregated
procedure for calculating economic depreciation, while far from perfect,
is better than the alternative of studying gross investment and assuming
that depreciation is a constant fraction of the past year's capital stock.
Nevertheless, as a further test of the robustness of the conclusion that RN
is important, I have estimated such a gross investment equation:
(4) — = -0.123 + 0.314 RNt_1 + 0.106 UCAPt_x Yt (0.082) (0.028)








These coefficients confirm the importance of RN but suggest that the net
investment specification overstates the importance of RN relative to
UCAP. However, the very large coefficient of the lagged capital variable,
implying an implausible 16 percent annual depreciation rate for plant and




The results are not sensitive to the use of capacity utilization to mea-
sure the effect of aggregate demand. Using the unemployment rate for
men over 19 years old leaves the coefficient of RN at 0.454 (standard
error = 0.077) while using the proportional gap between GNP and
capacity GNP leaves the coefficient of RNat 0.405 (s.e. = 0.070). A one
percentage point decline in this unemployment rate raises the investment
ratio by a relatively small 0.0016; similarly, a one percentage point
decline in the GNP gap raises the investment ratio by only 0.0010.
Additional accelerator variables (i.e., a distributed lag of proportional
33. Further evidence in favor of using the net investment series is present in section 14.4
below.263 Inflation, Tax Rules, and Investment
changes in GNP) were insignificant when capacity utilization was in-
cluded in the equation.
Several additional variables that are sometimes associated with invest-
ment were added to equation (2). Three of these variables were each
insignificant and changed the coefficient of RN by less than 0.02: the ratio
of corporate cash flow to GNP lagged one year; the ratio of the federal
government deficit to GNP lagged one year;
3
4 and a time trend. When the
one-year lagged value of Tobin's q variable is included,
3
5 its coefficient is
0.011 (with a standard error of 0.074) and the coefficient of RN drops
slightly to 0.391 (s.e. = 0.117).
The actual inflation rate (lagged one year), and the predicted long-term
inflation rate
3
6 (also lagged one year) were completely insignificant and
had very little effect on the coefficient of RN. Including both the actual
and expected inflation rates did not change this conclusion. The full effect
of inflation on investment is captured in the current specification by the
RN variable itself.
All of the specification experiments described in the past several para-
graphs have also been repeated with the cyclically adjusted RNA variable
with very similar results.
The specification in terms of the net return assumes that investment
responds equally to changes in the pretax return and in the effective tax
rate. Two tests of this assumption indicate that it is consistent with the
data. If, instead of using RNt _ x, equation (2) is reestimated with Rt _ 1 and 1-ETRf-i as separate variables, the sum of squared residuals actually
rises; i.e., the two variables actually explain less than their product does.
An explicit statistical test is possible if RN in equation (2) is replaced by
its logarithm; since In RN = inR + In (1 — ETR), the equality of the two
coefficients of In R and In (1 — ETR) can be tested explicitly.
3
7 Neither
coefficient is estimated very precisely (each has a f-statistic of less than
1.5) and the equality of the two coefficients is easily accepted (the
F-statistic is only 0.51).
Estimating the analogous decomposition for the cyclically adjusted
variables, i.e., replacing RNA by RA and 1-ETRA, is interesting be-
34. When the concurrent ratio of the federal deficit to GNP is included, its coefficient is
- 0.26 (with a standard error of 0.06) and the coefficient of RN drops to 0.21 (s.e. = 0.10).
This may be evidence of crowding out or it may merely reflect the tendency of more
investment to increase concurrent national income and thereby reduce the government
deficit.
35. This variable is the Holland and Meyers (1979) measure, defined as the ratio of the
aggregate market value of nonfinancial corporations to the net replacement cost of plant,
equipment, and inventories. Essentially the same result is obtained with their broader
measure in which all other nonfinancial assets are included.
36. The predicted inflation rate is based on a rolling series of ARIMA regressions; see
Feldstein and Summers (1978, pp. 170-74).
37. The switch from RN to In RN causes a small decrease in the explanatory power of the
equation.264 The Effect on Investment
cause it sheds light on the question of whether the year-to-year noncycli-
cal variations in the pretax return matter. Two things should be noted.
First, this substitution reduces the explanatory power of the equation as
measured by the corrected R
2; this favors keeping the simple specification
in terms of RNA. Second, if both variables are included separately, the
coefficient of the RA variable is much less than its standard error (0.033
with a standard error of 0.172) while the coefficient of the ETRA variable
is statistically significant and economically important: -0.044 with a
standard error of 0.017. This suggests that year-to-year fluctuations in the
pretax return have not been important but that the rise in ETRA from
about 0.57 in the mid-1960s to about 0.85 in the mid-1970s was enough to
reduce the investment ratio by more than one percentage point.
An important indication of the plausibility and reliability of any simple
model is the stability of the coefficients in different subperiods. Equations
(5) and (6) show the result of splitting the sample in half:






SSR = 1.291 (10 "
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The coefficients of RN are remarkably similar and the relevant F-statistic
indicates that the hypothesis of equal coefficients for the two subperiods
cannot be rejected at the 5 percent level.
3
8
A further test of the robustness and usefulness of an equation is its
performance in out-of-sample forecasts. The basic specification was
reestimated for the period 1954-70 and this equation was then used to
predict the investment ratio for each year from 1971 through 1978. These
38. Even the two coefficients of the capacity utilization variable do not differ in a
statistically significant way; the difference between them of 0.049 has a standard error of














































































NOTE: Predictors are based on equations fitted through 1970 only. Columns 2 and 5 are
based on the specification of equation (1) while columns 3 and 6 are based on the specifica-
tion of equation (12).
predictions are based on the two lagged variables only (RNt-i and
UCAPt-x) and do not use the lagged disturbance («f_i) or any lagged
dependent variable. The results shown in table 14.2 are remarkably good.
The mean absolute prediction error (0.0035) is only two-thirds of the
mean year-to-year change (0.0050) in the investment ratio. The year-to-
year changes are also predicted quite well, with the correct sign in 6 of the
7 years and a mean error that is only one-third of the average change.
To conclude the discussion of the net return model of investment
behavior, it is useful to consider its implication for understanding the
decline in the investment ratio since 1966. The first column of table 14.3
shows that the investment ratio fell from 0.045 in 1966 to less than half
that value in the last four years of the sample period. The 1965 value of
RN was 0.065, the highest of any year in the sample, and the 1965 value of
UCAP was 0.896, the second highest value and only slightly below the
1966 UCAP value of 0.911. Column 2 uses the estimated effect of changes
in RN (i.e., 0.459 from equation 2) to calculate the investment ratio for
each of the 25 sample years conditional on RN = 0.065; i.e., each figure
in column 2 equals the corresponding figure in column 1 plus 0.459 times
(0.065 - RNf-i). Similarly, column 3 uses the estimated effect of
changes in UCAP to calculate the investment ratio conditional on UCAP
= 0.896.
3
9 It is clear from the figures in column 2 that the fall in RN can
account for most of the decline in the investment ratio since 1966 and that
the fluctuations in UCAP after 1966 cannot account for much of the
decline. If RN had been kept at its 1965 level, net investment from 1970 to





































































































































































































a. Columns 2, 3, and 4 are based on equation (2); columns 5 and 6 are based on equation
(13).
1978 would have taken an average of 4.1 percent of GNP instead of the
actual average of only 2.5 percent, an increase of two-thirds. By contrast,
maintaining the high 1965 level of capacity utilization would only have
raised the average investment-GNP ratio by 0.5 percentage points. It is
also worth noting that if the 1965 level of RN had been reached a decade
earlier, investment during that decade would have averaged an additional
1.2 percent of GNP. Equation (2) can also be used to estimate an
approximate but explicit effect of inflation on the investment ratio. In an
earlier study, Lawrence Summers and I estimated the change in the tax
liability on corporate source income that is caused by the interaction of267 Inflation, Tax Rules, and Investment
inflation and the tax laws.
4
0 For example, in 1977 (the last year of our
study) inflation raised the tax liability by $31.9 billion or 1.9 percent of the
corresponding capital stock.
4
1 The estimate of RNt_i in equation (2)
implies that a 1.9 percentage point increase in RN for 1977 would raise
the 1978 investment ratio by 0.009 to 0.034; this value is shown in column
4 of table 14.3. Similarly calculated values for earlier years indicate that
the interaction between inflation and the tax rules reduced investment in
the 1970s by an average of 0.8 percent of GNP or about one-third of the
actual level of net investment.
14.4 Investment and the Rate of Return over Cost
In the absence of taxes, the simplest specification of a firm's investment
behavior is that it invests whenever the rate of return on an available
project exceeds the cost of additional funds.
4
2 More generally, the costs of
changing the rate of investment and the uncertainty associated with
investment returns make the firm's decision problem more complex.
4
3 It
is, nevertheless, useful to describe the firm's rate of investment as re-
sponding to the difference between potential rates of return and the cost
of funds.
In terms of the traditional marginal efficiency of investment schedule
that Keynes borrowed from Irving Fisher, an upward shift of the marginal
efficiency schedule or a downward shift in the cost of funds will increase
the rate of investment. If we select a particular rate of investment, we can
measure the upward shift of the marginal efficiency schedule by what
happens to the internal rate of return at that rate of investment.
4
4 A rise in
the difference between the internal rate of return and the cost of funds
should induce a higher rate of investment.
This idea can be extended to an economy with a complex tax structure
and with inflation. A change in the tax rules or in the expected rate of
inflation alters the rate of return on all projects (in a sense that I will make
more precise below). These fiscal and inflation changes therefore act in a
way that is equivalent to shifting the marginal efficiency of investment
schedule in a simpler economy.
When we switch from a taxless economy to one with company taxes
and depreciation rules, the concept of the internal rate of return must be
40. See chap. 8 above (Feldstein and Summers, 1979), table 8.4, col. 9 for the series of
inflation-induced tax increases.
41. For the capital stock figures, see Feldstein and Poterba (1980a, table A-l, col. 8.
42. I have borrowed Irving Fisher's phrase "the rate of return over cost" but not his
exact meaning. The model in the current section is nevertheless very close in spirit to
Fisher's analysis.
43. See Abel (1978) for an explicit derivation of the optimum rule when there are
endogenous adjustment costs.
44. Unless the shift is a uniform one, the answer will depend on the initial point that is
selected. This is a typical index number type problem.268 The Effect on Investment
extended to what I shall call the maximum potential net return (MPNR).
For simplicity, I shall describe this first for the case in which the firm relies
exclusively on debt finance. I shall then note how the analysis is easily
extended to include equity finance as well.
In a taxless economy, the internal rate of return on a project is the
maximum rate of return that a firm can afford to pay on a loan used to
finance that project. If Lt is the loan balance at time t and xt (for t = 1,2,
. . . ,T) is the internal rate of return is the interest rate r that satisfies the
difference equation:
(7) Lt-Lt_1 = rLt_1-x,
where Lo is the initial cost of the project and LT = 0. Solution of equation




When a tax at rate T is levied on the net output minus the sum of the
interest payment and the allowable depreciation (dt), the maximum
potential interest rate (MPIR) is defined according to
(9) L, - L,_! = rLt_! - xt + T(X, - d, - rL^)
where LT — 0 and Lo equals the initial cost of the project minus any
investment tax credit.
If xt is the real cash flow of the project, inflation at a constant rate IT has
the effect of increasing the nominal cash flow to (1 + IT)' xt and the MPIR
rises to the value of r that solves:
(10) Lf-L^^rL^-Cl + or)'*,
Although in a taxless world the MPIR would rise by the rate of inflation,
the relative importance of historic cost depreciation and the deductibility
of nominal interest payments determines whether r rises by more or less
than the increase in IT.
The calculation of the MPIR is made operational by specifying the real
cash flow from a hypothetical project and the associated series of allow-
able tax depreciation. I adopt here the same specifications that I used in
Feldstein and Summers (1978; chap. 9 above). The hypothetical project is
a "sandwich" of which 66.2 percent of the investment in the first year is a
structure that lasts 30 years and the remainder is an equipment invest-
ment that is replaced at the end of 10 years and 20 years.
4
5 The internal
45. The 66.2 percent ratio is selected to produce a steady-state investment mix corres-
ponding to the average composition over the past twenty years. Note that this specification
ignores inventories and therefore the very substantial extra tax burden caused by inflation269 Inflation, Tax Rules, and Investment
rate of return in the absence of taxes is set at 12 percent for both the
equipment and structure components. The net output of the equipment is
subject to exponential decay at 13 percent until it is scrapped while the
net output of the structure is subject to 3 percent decay. The depreciation
rules, tax rate, and credits are then varied from year to year as the law
changes.
The expected rate of inflation in each year is calculated from the
consumer expenditure deflator using the optimal ARIMA forecasting
procedure of Box and Jenkins (1970).
4
6 The calculation assumes that
forecasts made at each date are based only on the information available at
that time and that the ARIMA process estimated at each date is based
only on the most recent 10 years of quarterly data. The calculation of the
MPIR is based on the entire sequence of forecast future inflation rates
and not on any single average long-term expected inflation rate.
4
7
It firms did finance marginal projects exclusively by debt, it would be
sufficient to relate the net rate of investment to the difference between
the MPIR and the long-term nominal interest rate (as well as to capacity
utilization or some other measure of cyclical demand). More generally,
however, since firms do not use only debt finance, the concept of the
MPIR must be extended to the maximum potential net return (MPNR),
defined as the maximum net-of-corporate-tax nominal yield that the firm
can afford to pay. The net rate of investment can then be related to the
difference between the MPNR and the net-of-corporate-tax nominal cost
of funds.
The method of calculating the MPIR in the all-debt case can be applied
directly to find the value of the MPNR. In the special all-debt case, the
MPNR = (1 — T)/-; the solution of a difference equation like (10) is
therefore equivalent to finding MPNR/(1 — T) in the all-debt case. More
generally, however, regardless of the mix of debt and equity finance, the
solution of (10) can be interpreted as equivalent to MPNR/(1 — T). Since
T is known, this yields MPNR directly. Annual values for MPNR are
presented in column 1 of table 14.4
Note that the MPNR is defined in terms of a hypothetical project with a
fixed pretax yield of 12 percent. All of the year-to-year variation in the
MPNR is due to changes in tax rules and expected inflation. An alterna-
tive MPNR series has also been calculated in which the pretax rate of
return is allowed to vary; more specifically, MPNRVP (VP for varying
with FIFO inventory accounting. While this need not affect decisions to subsitute capital for
labor, it does influence the return on capital expansion to the extent that this involves
greater inventories.
46. The calculation of expected inflation series is described in chap. 9 (Feldstein and
Summers, 1978), pp. 170-74.
47. To meet the need for a series of expected long-term inflation rates for other
purposes, Feldstein and Summers (1978; chap. 9 above) calculate a weighted average of
these future inflation rates where the weights are equivalent to discounting at a fixed interest




























































































































































profitability) replaces the 12 percent assumption with a cyclically ad-
justed profitability series for each year's new investment that is very
similar to the RA variable discussed in section 14.3.
4
8 The MPNRVP
series is presented in column 2 of table 14.4.
The MPNR is the net nominal amount that firms can potentially afford
to pay for funds. The actual net nominal cost of funds depends on the
marginal mix of debt and equity funds. The correct assumption about this
marginal mix is not clear. In the current analysis, I have assumed that
firms use debt and equity at the margin in the same ratio that they do on
average, i.e., that debt accounts for only one-third of total finance. This
implies that the net nominal cost of funds is:
(11) COF= -(1-
where i is the long-term bond interest rate and e is the real equity earnings
48. See chap.9 (Feldstein and Summers, 1978) for a description of the cyclically adjusted
return series used in the present calculation.271 Inflation, Tax Rules, and Investment
per dollar of share value.
4
9 The cost of funds series is presented in column
3.
This section examines a model that makes the rate of net investment a
function of (1) the difference between the potential and actual cost of
funds and (2) the rate of capacity utilization:
jn
(
12) — = bo + bx{MPNR- COF),_! + b2UCAPt_1 + ut
Columns 4 and 5 of table 14.4 present the time series of this yield
difference. These figures indicate that the incentive was low in the 1950s,
became quite powerful in the mid-1960s, began to fail in the early 1970s
and then dropped very sharply in the mid-1970s.
The pattern of the past decade reflects the fact that, because of historic
cost depreciation, inflation raised the MPNR rather little while the cost of
funds rose substantially.
5
0 Between 1966 and 1976, the cost of funds rose




As in section 14.2, the current analysis uses annual data and lags both
regressors one year. Equation (12) and a variety of related specifications
have been estimated by least squares with a first-order autocorrelation
correction. Specific tests for the basic specifications show that the implied
constraints are not binding, i.e., that the first-order autocorrelation cor-
rection is not inferior to a more general first-order ARM A process.
Estimates in first-difference form also produce coefficients very similar to
those obtained with the autocorrelation transformation.
The basic parameter estimates
(13) -L=- 0.040+ 0.316 {MPNR-COF\_X Yt (0.066)








49. The inverse of e is the product of (1) the Standard and Poor's price-earnings ratio and
(2) the ratio of "book profits" to "economics profits" with correction for inflationary affects
on reported depreciation, inventory profits, and debt.
50. Inflation also raised the cost of funds because the cost of equity funds was raised
more than the cost of debt funds fell.
51. This is roughly consistent with a regression equation that indicates that, for the
sample as a whole, each one percentage point increase in the long-term expected inflation
rate reduced the difference MPNR-COF by about 1.25 percentage points. Between 1966
and 1976, the long-term expected inflation rate (demand from the ARIMA forecasts) rose
3.2 percentage points.272 The Effect on Investment
indicate the yield differential has a powerful effect and the variations in
capacity utilization are also important.
5
2
Since the return-over-cost variable had a standard deviation of 0.017
over the sample period, a move from one standard deviation below the
mean to one standard deviation above would raise the investment ratio
by 0.011, approximately 1.3 times its standard deviation and 40 percent of
its 25-year average value. A two-standard deviation move in capacity
utilization would raise investment by 0.006, or only about half as much.
Using the varying-profitability measure of the potential net return
reduces the corresponding coefficient:
(14) —=-0.031+ 0.219 (MPNRVP-COF)t_t Yt (0.049)
+ 0.069 UCAPt_1 + 0.71 M,_!
(0.020) (0.17)
jp = 0 784
DWS = 2.02
SSR = 2.931 (10"
4)
1955-77
However, since this measure is much more variable (the standard devia-
tion of MPNRVP-COF is 0.028), a two-standard deviation move im-
plies a slightly bigger change of 0.012 in the investment ratio.
Lagged values of the regressors were insignificant and polynomial
distributed lags of different lengths for the return-over-cost variable did
not alter the implications of equations (12) and (13). Redefining the
investment variable as a ratio to capacity GNP had no effect on the
coefficients. Similarly, substituting for capacity utilization the unemploy-
ment rate for men over age 19 or the GNP gap ratio did not significantly
alter the coefficient of the return-over-cost variable. Moreover, a distrib-
uted lag of proportional changes in past output was insignificant when
capacity utilization was included in the equation.
The switch from the net investment equation to a gross investment
equation caused some reduction in the coefficient of the return-over-cost
variable (to 0.215 with a standard error of 0.072), but the extremely small
and totally insignificant coefficient of the lagged capital stock variables
(0.002 with a standard error of 0.093) makes this gross investment spe-
cification implausible.
A time trend and a lagged ratio of corporate cash flow to GNP were
tried as additional variables; neither was significant and the coefficient of
the return-over-cost variable remained unchanged. A lagged ratio of
retained earnings to GNP was "mildly significant" (a f-statistic of 1.3) but
52. Because MPNR does not reflect cyclical variations in the rate of return, these
parameter values are most appropriately compared with those of equation (3) rather than
equation (1).273 Inflation, Tax Rules, and Investment
left the coefficient of the return-over-cost variable unchanged. The
lagged ratio of the federal government deficit to GNP had a surprisingly
positive coefficient but its inclusion did not alter the coefficient of the
return-over-cost variable. The one-year lagged value of Tobin's q ratio
had a coefficient of 0.012 (with a standard error of 0.009), while the
coefficient of the return-over-cost variable remained essentially un-
changed at 0.289 (with a standard error of 0.068). Neither the current
inflation rate nor the expected inflation rate was statistically significant.
A powerful test of the appropriateness of equation (13) is obtained by
estimating separate coefficients for the rate of return (MPNR) and cost of
funds (COF) variables:
(
15) — = -0.055+ 0.469 MPNRt_x - 0-319COFt_x
Yt (0.261) (0-068)





SSR = 2.895 (MT
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A comparison of the sum of squared residuals of equations (13) and (15)
shows that the coefficients of MPNR and COF do not differ significantly.
The separate coefficient of COF in equation (15) is almost identical to the
combined return-over-cost coefficient in equation (13); the coefficient of
the return variable is larger but so too is its standard error.
The separate estimate of the MPNR coefficient in equation (15) is also
particularly important because the MPNR variable reflects only the in-
teraction of tax rules and inflation but not the market interest rate or
equity yield. The finding that the MPNR coefficient is even larger than




A test of the stability of the basic coefficients over time also provides
reassuring support about the plausibility and reliability of the model.
Equations (16) and (17) show the result of splitting the sample in half:
(16) _L = -0.036+ 0.465 (MPNR-COF\_l
Yt (0.266)








53. A similar analysis with the varying profitability measure of return provides even
more striking confirmation: the coefficient of MPNRVP is 0.253 (s.e. = 0.155) while the
coefficient of COR is -0.202 (s.e. = 0.084).274 The Effect on Investment
(17) JL. = -0.044+ 0.300 (MPNR-COF\_l
Yt (0.030)




SSR = 0.201 (KT
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The coefficients are quite similar and the F-statistic of 0.695 indicates that
the hypothesis of an unchanged structure cannot be rejected at any
conventional level of significance. The results for the varying-profitability
specification are even more striking: the coefficient of the return-over-
cost variable is 0.206 (s. e. = 0.089) in the first half of the period and 0.200
(s.e. = 0.033) in the second half.
Out-of-sample forecasts based on estimating equation (12) for 1955
through 1970 are shown in table 14.2. The agreement between the actual
and predicted investment ratios is quite close. The mean absolute predic-
tion error (0.0035) is the same as with the net return equation of section
14.2 and only two-thirds of the mean year-to-year change in the invest-
ment ratio. The year-to-year changes are predicted even more closely and
both turning points are correctly indentified.
The parameter estimates of equation (13) can be used to analyze the
sharp decline in net investment since 1966. Column 5 of table 14.3 shows
the investment ratio which in principle would have been observed if the
return over cost had remained at its 1965 value of 0.043. Instead of
dropping to an average of only 0.025 from 1970 through 1977, it would
have averaged 40 percent higher, 0.035. By contrast, even if the capacity
utilization rate could have been kept at the overheated level of 0.896, the
investment ratio in the 1970-77 period would only have increased 20
percent to 0.030.
The specific contribution of inflation to the decline in the value of the
return-over-cost variable is difficult to determine. One simple way of
measuring this effect is by a regression of the return-over-cost variable on
the predicted long-term inflation rate. The coefficient in this regression
(- 1.27 with a standard error of 0.11) and the rise in the long-term
inflation variable by 0.034 between 1965 and 1976 together imply that
inflation reduced the return over cost by 0.0432 during this period. The
coefficient of the return-over-cost variable (0.316 in equation 13) implies
that inflation reduced the investment ratio by 0.14 over this period. This
equals almost all of the 0.015 fall in the investment ratio caused by the275 Inflation, Tax Rules, and Investment
decline in the return over cost
5
4 and more than half of the observed
decline in the investment ratio between 1966 and 1977.
14.5 The Flexible Capital Stock Adjustment Model
The flexible capital stock adjustment model developed by Jorgenson
and his collaborators is the direct descendant of that great workhorse of
investment equations, the accelerator. Instead of the accelerator's
assumption of a fixed capital-output ratio, the more general model allows
the capital-output ratio to respond to changes in the cost of capital
ownership and therefore to changes in tax rules and inflation. Implicit in
the simplest version of this model are a number of very strong and
generally undesirable assumptions, including homogeneous capital, a
putty-putty technology, constant proportional replacement, myopic and
risk-neutral decision making, and a known, exogenous financial mix. This
section accepts these assumptions in order to focus on the problem of
measuring the effect of inflation in the framework of this popular and
influential model. The analysis shows that the traditional implementation
of the model has not given adequate attention to inflation and that any
attempt to analyze the recent investment experience on the basis of that
implementation would be misleading
The analysis here is limited to investment in equipment. The procedure
of estimating separate investment equations for equipment and struc-
tures is traditional in this framework because the tax rules differ from the
two types of equipment. The implicit assumption of two independent
investment demand functions, one for equipment-capital and the other
for structure-capital, is clearly a poor description of reality. To the extent
that investments in structures and equipment are decided as a package,
the model of section 14.4 is a preferable specification.
5
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The basic model is well known and can be summarized briefly. Each
firm has a desired capital stock at each time (K*) and, to the extent that its
actual capital falls short of the desired capital, the firm immediately
orders capital goods to eliminate the difference. The sum of installed
capital and capital on order is thus equal to the desired capital stock at the
end of each period. This implies that in each period the net stock of
outstanding orders is increased or decreased by exactly the change in the
desired capital stock, K* — K*_1. Since there are delivery delays, the
54. This 0.015 is the difference between the actual 1977 investment ratio of 0.020 and the
predicted ratio of 0.035 conditional on maintaining the 1965 level of the return over cost.
55. This specification also ignores the adverse effect of inflation through the taxation of
artificial inventory profits. This will matter to the extent that inventories, equipment, and
structures are part of a combined investment-output decision.276 The Effect on Investment
observed net investment can be represented by a distributed lag distribu-
tion of these orders:
(18) l?=iiwj(K*_j-KUj-i)-
This specification is based on an implicit assumption about replace-
ment investment: The existing stock decays exponentially at a constant
rate d, requiring replacement investment of dKt_ x to be made in year t to
maintain the capital stock. Since firms know the delivery lag distribution
exactly, they can anticipate the replacement investment that will be
required in each future year (up to the length of the longest delivery lag)
and can therefore order replacement investment far enough in advance to
make exactly the required replacement. Gross investment is therefore
given by:
(19) If = .1 Wj (K*_j - K*_j_ 2) + dKt_ x
With a constant elasticity of substitution production function, the
first-order conditions of profit maximization imply that the desired capital
stock is related to the level of output (Q), the price of output (p) and the
annual cost of capital services (c) according to:
5
6
(20) K* = cf {p/c)7 Q,
where cr is the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor and a is
the capital coefficient in the production function. Substituting (20) into
(19) yields:
(21) lf = trii
The accelerator model implicity assumes cr = 0 while the Cobb-Douglas
technology assumed by Jorgenson and his collaborators implies a = 1. In
this section, I shall show that the flexible model with cr > 0 is more
strongly supported by the data than the simpler accelerator model. The
maximum likelihood estimate of a is less than one but the likelihood
function is too flat to reject the Cobb-Douglas assumption.
5
7
The annual cost of capital services reflects the price level for invest-
ment goods (pi), the real net cost of funds (R), the exponential rate of
56. Output is measured by the gross domestic product of nonfinancial corporations and p
is the implicit price deflator for that output. The value of c is denned below.
57. I should again stress that these interferences are all conditional on very strong and
obviously "false" assumptions. For example, it seems very likely that the assumption of a
"putty-putty" technology causes an understatement of the true long-run elasticity of sub-
stitution if the true technology is putty-clay.277 Inflation, Tax Rules, and Investment
depreciation (d), the corporate tax rate (T), the investment tax credit
5
8




Inflation affects the value of this crucial variable in two important
ways, through the cost of funds (R) and through the present value of
depreciation (Z). In their original study, Hall and Jorgenson (1967).
assumed a fixed nominal interest rate of 20 percent for the cost of funds.
In the most recent of the Jorgenson studies, this assumption was replaced
by the specification that R - (1 - T)Z where / is a long-term bond interest
rate (Gordon and Jorgenson, 1976). This overstates the cost of debt
capital (by ignoring inflation) and ignores the role of equity capital. The
expected real net cost of debt capital is (1 — j)i — TT (where TT is expected
inflation) since the debt is repaid in depreciated dollars.
5
9 Column 1 of
table 14.5 presents this measure of the real net cost of debt. Despite the
rapid rise in the Baa rate itself, the real net cost of debt funds actually
declined since the mid-1960s.
The cost of equity capital (e) is the ratio of equity earnings per dollar of
share price. The conventional earnings-price ratio can be misleading
when there is inflation since it is based on book earnings rather than real
economic earnings. Book earnings overstate real earnings by using his-
toric cost depreciation and some FIFO inventory accounting but also
understate real earnings by excluding the real reduction in the value of
outstanding debt that occurs because of inflation.
6
0 The correct earnings
price ratio is presented in column 2 of table 14.5. The cost of equity funds
clearly rose substantially since the mid-1960s even when the conventional
series is appropriately corrected.
Defining the real net cost of funds (R) as a fixed-weight average with




58. To simplify notation, I use X to refer to the investment tax credit with the Long-
amendment adjustment when appropriate. Data on the investment tax credit refer to actual
practice and were supplied by Data Resources, Inc.
59. The putty-putty technology allows all decisions to be myopic and therefore in
principle makes the short-term interest rate and short-term inflation rate the relevant
variable (Hall, 1977). A more realistic description of finance and technology makes a
long-term interest rate and inflation the appropriate variables. I have in fact used the Baa
corporate bond rate and the long-term inflation expectation derived from the "rolling"—
ARIMA estimates presented in Feldstein and Summers (1978; chap. 9 above).
60. Equivalently, book earnings are net of nominal interest payments rather than real
interest payments. In my calculation, the debt is the net financial capital supplied by the
creditors of the nonfinancial corporations and inflation is measured by the change in the
consumer price index.
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This series, presented in column 3 of table 14.5, shows no trend from the
mid-1950s through the mid-1960s but then a gradual but substantial rise
to the mid-1970s.
The second important way in which inflation affects the cost of capital
services is through the value of depreciation. Since depreciation allow-
ances are fixed in nominal terms, the real present value of the deprecia-
tion (Z) is reduced when the rate of inflation rises. This present value
should be calculated using a nominal cost of funds or, equivalently, the
future depreciation allowances should be restated in real terms and then
discounted at the real cost of funds. Column 4 of table 14.5 presented the
nominal cost of funds; this is the real cost of funds (shown in column 3)
plus the expected rate of inflation.
6
2 The values of Z presented in column
5 reflect changes in this discount rate as well as changes in the deprecia-
tion rules.
6
3 In the early years, Z rose significantly but, after 1964, Z
drifted down because of the rising discount rate despite the continuing
acceleration of depreciation.
The importance of specifying this discount rate correctly can be seen by
comparing these Z values with the alternative "Z10" values presented in
column 6; the Z10 values are calculated with a constant 10 percent
discount rate, the procedure used by Jorgenson and his collaborators.
With a constant discount rate, the evolution of the Z10 variable reflects
only the increasingly favorable statutory rules and therefore has actually
increased during the past decade while the true value has been declining.
The composite relative cost of capital services (i.e., the c variable
defined in equation (22) deflated by the output price) is presented in
column 7 of table 14.5. This measure of the relative cost of capital services
falls gradually from the 1950s to a low point in the mid-1960s and then
begins rising again. By the end of the sample period (1977), the relative
cost of capital is back to its level of the 1950s. This reversal of the
incentive to invest is not observed if the inflation induced changes in Z
and R are ignored; column 8 presents a false relative cost series that
incorporates Z10 (i.e., a constant 10 percent discount rate to value
depreciation) and that measures the cost of funds by the net nominal
interest rate.
The Cobb-Douglas technology assumed by Jorgenson and his collabo-
rators is a convenient place to begin testing the significance of the relative
cost of capital services. I have estimated equation (21) subject to the
restriction that the elasticity of substitution is one and compared it to the
62. In the pure debt case, this would just be the net-of-tax nominal interest rate.
63. The calculation of Z reflects the introduction of accelerated depreciation and the
several reductions in the allowable depreciation life.281 Inflation, Tax Rules, and Investment
simpler accelerator model in which the elasticity of substitution is zero. In
both specifications, the distributed lag weights were constrained to fit a
third-degree polynomial (with four years of lags and a fifth year con-
strained to zero).
By purely statistical criteria, the evidence clearly favors the Cobb-
Douglas price sensitivity model to the accelerator model. With the Cobb-
Douglas technology, the R
2 is 0.980 and the sum of squared residuals is
112.3. By contrast, for the accelerator model the R
2 is only 0.961 and the
sum of squared residuals is 215.9. An approximate likelihood ratio test
strongly rejects the restriction to a zero substitution elasticity.
6
4
Misspecifying the cost-of-capital series by failing to represent correctly
the effect of inflation also reduces the explanatory power of the model.
Following the Jorgenson procedure of evaluating depreciation allow-
ances with a fixed 10 percent interest rate and defining the cost of funds in
terms of the net nominal rate (i.e., using the incorrect dp series presented
in column 8 of table 14.5) cause the R
2 to fall to 0.970 (from 0.980) and
raises the sum of squared residuals to 167.4 (from 112.3).
Although relaxing the Cobb-Douglas assumption and estimating the
elasticity of substitution could in principle indicate the sensitivity of
investment to the cost of capital services, the data are not informative
enough to provide a precise value for this parameter. With the correctly
measured value of the user cost of capital, the maximum likelihood
estimate of the substitution elasticity is 0.9 but the reduction in the sum of
squared residuals to 112.2 is trivial.
6
5
Further tests of the cost-sensitivity assumption can in principle be
achieved by allowing separate elasticities with respect to the different
components of the cost of capital services. In place of equation (20), the
more general specification is:
(
24) K* = Qt
1-T
(1-Z-X)
Instead of trying to estimate all these elasticities, three different forms of
(24) were tried. The first constrains a"! = 1. The resulting estimates for a2
and CT3 were 1.8 and 3.2, respectively, but the reduction in the sum of
squared residuals to 100.4 from 112.3 in the Cobb-Douglas case is not
significant. The second specification, which constrains v1 = <r3, implies
64. In both the Cobb-Douglas and accelerator specifications, the estimated value of the
depreciation rate (i.e., the coefficient of the lagged capital stock variable) is approximately
0.18, a reasonable value for equipment capital although higher than the value of 0.138 used
in the cost of capital services formula and the Department of Commerce depreciation rate.
65. The value of 0.9 is obtained by searching over a grid at intervals of 0.1. It is worth
noting that a mismeasurement of the cost of capital series distorts the estimate of the
elasticity of substitution. Using the incorrect c/p series of column 8 leads to an estimated
elasticity of substitution of 0.6. The reduction in the sum of squared residuals to 157.4 (from
167.4 in the Cobb-Douglas case) is, however, small and not statistically significant.282 The Effect on Investment
estimates of a2 = 0.6 and o^ = a3 = 1 but the sum of squared residuals
(106.6) is again not significantly lower than in the Cobb-Douglas spe-
cification. Finally, the constraint that ax = a2 implies estimates of o^ =
d2 — 0.5 and CT3 = 1.0; the sum of squared residuals of 97.0 is again not
sufficiently low to cause a rejection of the Cobb-Douglas assumption.
The Chow test for the stability of the coefficients easily sustains the
hypothesis of no change between the first and second halves of the
sample, but that is more a reflection of the small sample than of any close
agreement in parameter values.
It should be clear from the remarks earlier in this paper that I believe
that the assumptions involved in the present model are far too restrictive
and implausible for the model to be regarded as "true" in any sense. It is,
however, of some importance that, even within the highly constrained
assumptions of the present model, the data provide clear support for a
responsiveness of investment to changes in a correctly measured cost of
capital services in general and to the changes caused by inflation in
particular. Although the data are not rich enough to provide precise
estimates of the responsiveness of investment to the individual compo-
nents of the cost of capital, it is worth noting that the evidence shows that
a correct accounting of the impact of inflation substantially improves the
ability of the analysis to explain the variation in investment over the past
25 years.
On the assumption of a Cobb-Douglas technology, the fall in the
relative cost of capital services between the mid-1950s and the mid-1960s
was enough to raise the desired ratio of equipment capital to output by
nearly 12 percent.
6
6 Since net equipment investment averaged only about
3 percent of the equipment capital stock at the beginning of the period,
the desired increase in capital would require a rise of more than 40
percent in the ratio of equipment investment to capital to achieve the
desired capital output ratio within a decade and a bigger rise to achieve
the adjustment sooner. In fact, the investment-capital ratio in 1966-69
was 0.065, more than double its average in 1956-65.
The subsequent rise in the value of dp to an average of 0.235 for the
years 1974-77 reversed the previous change in the desired capital-output
ratio. A Cobb-Douglas technology implies a reduction in the desired
capital-output ratio of nearly 10 percent between the mid-1960s and the
mid-1970s. Achieving this 10 percent change in the capital-output ratio
required a much larger portional fall in investment during the transition
period. In fact, the rate of growth of the net equipment capital stock fell
sharply, from 0.065 in 1966-69 to 0.036 in 1976-79. This in turn implied a
66. The value of c/p in column 7 of table 14.5 fell from an average of 0.238 in 1954-57 to
0.213 in 1964-67. The Cobb-Douglas technology implies (see equation 20) that the optimal
capital-output ratio is increased by a factor of 238/213 = 1.117.283 Inflation, Tax Rules, and Investment
one-third fall in the ratio of equipment investment to GNP, from 2.0 in
the mid-1960s to 1.3 percent in the mid-1970s.
The specific impact of inflation in this model operates through two
channels. First, inflation increases the cost of capital services by reducing
the present value of depreciation allowances (Z), a reduction that reflects
the increasing nominal cost of funds. Second, inflation can increase the
cost of capital services directly by raising the real cost of funds (R).
67 The
combined effect of both of these changes can be seen by comparing the
actual cost of capital services (column 7 of table 14.5) with the cost of
capital services calculated with the real and nominal costs of funds held
constant at their 1965 levels (column 9). Instead of rising between the
mid-1960s and the mid-1970s, the cost of capital falls sharply, reflecting
the favorable changes in statutory tax rules. A similar, although less
dramatic, conclusion appears even if the effect of inflation in raising the
real cost of funds is ignored. The figures in column 10 calculate Z by using
a nominal cost of funds constructed as the actual real cost of funds plus
the 1965 expected inflation rate of 1.8 percent. Although the difference
between columns 7 and 10 understates the adverse effect of inflation,
even this measure shows that without the increase in inflation the incen-
tive to investment would have become stronger rather than weaker in the
decade after the mid-1960s.
14.6 Concluding Remarks
I began this paper by emphasizing that theoretical models of macroeco-
nomic equilibrium should specify explicitly the role of distortionary
taxes, especially taxes on capital income. The failure to include such tax
rules can have dramatic and misleading effects on the qualitative as well
as the quantitative properties of macroeconomic theories. The statistical
evidence presented later in the paper bears out the likely importance of
these fiscal effects in studying the nonneutrality of expected inflation.
In discussing the problem of statistical inference, I noted that the
complexity of economic problems, the inadequacies of economic data,
and the weakness of the restrictions imposed by general economic theory
together make it impossible to apply in practice the textbook injunction
to estimate a "true" model within which all parameter values can be
inferred and all hypotheses tested. Learning in economics is a more
complex and imperfectly understood process in which we develop judg-
ments and convictions by combining econometric estimates, theoretical
insights and institutional knowledge. The use of several alternative
"false" models can strengthen our understanding and confidence because
the same biases are not likely to be present in quite different models.
67. Inflation raises R to the extent that the required equity yield rises by more than the
real cost of debt capital falls.284 The Effect on Investment
This view of the problem of statistical inference in econometrics leads
me to conclude that as practicing econometricians we should be both
more humble and more optimistic than is currently fashionable. We
should have the humility to recognize that each econometric study is just
another piece of information about a complex subject rather than the
definitive estimate of some true model. But we should also be more
optimistic that the accumulating and sifting of this econometric informa-
tion will permit specialists to make better and more informed judgments.
I illustrated these theoretical and statistical ideas by estimating alterna-
tive models of investment behavior with a focus on understanding how
the interaction between inflation and existing tax rules has influenced
investment behavior. The results of each of these models show that the
rising rate of inflation has, because of the structure of existing U.S. tax
rules, substantially discouraged investment in the past 15 years.
A more general implication of these results is that monetary policy is
far from neutral with respect to economic activity, even in the long run
when the induced change in inflation is fully anticipated. Because of the
nonindexed fiscal structure, even a fully anticipated rate of inflation
causes a misallocation of resources in general and a distortion of re-
sources away from investment in plant and equipment in particular.
6
8 The
traditional idea of "easy money to encourage investment" that has guided
U.S. policy for the past 20 years has backfired and, by raising the rate of
inflation, has actually caused a reduction in investment.
6
9
It would, of course, be useful to extend the current analysis in a number
of ways. I am currently examining how the interaction of inflation and tax
rules affects the demand for consumption in general and for housing
capital in particular. Further studies should be done on the effects of
inflation and tax rules on the demand for government debt, on financial
markets, and on international capital flows.™ More information about
investment behavior could be developed by applying the three models of
the current paper on a more disaggregated basis.
I began this paper by commenting that Irving Fisher's analysis of
inflation had ignored the effects of taxation. Even so, Fisher favored the
very tax reform that would eliminate the distorting effects of inflation on
68. This conclusion stands in sharp contrast to the early view of Hayek and others that
inflation encourages investment by raising profits or the appearance of profits. That view not
only ignored fiscal effects but also was essentially a short-run theory since wages and other
costs, as well as expectations, would naturally adjust to inflation.
69. On the role of the fiscal structure in the mismanagement of monetary policy, see
Feldstein (1980a).
70. Poterba (1980) and Summers (1980a) discuss the theoretical impact of inflation on
the demand for housing capital. Hartman (1979) presents an analysis of the effect on
international capital flows and Feldstein (1980c; chap. 5 above) treats the demand for
government debt. Empirical applications are, however, still lacking.285 Inflation, Tax Rules, and Investment
the taxation of capital income. In a lecture published in the January 1937
issue of Econometrica entitled "Income in Theory and Income Taxation
in Practice," Fisher advocated a progressive expenditure or consumption
tax. Although his reasons for preferring such a tax did not include its
inflation neutrality, my remarks today give a further reason for thinking
that Fisher was right.